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Whither central banking?
The history of central banking can be 
divided into periods of consensus about 
the roles and function of central banks, 
interspersed with periods of uncer-
tainty, often following a crisis, in which 
central banks are searching for a new 
consensus. The time line is roughly as 
follows:
Table 1
History of central banks has swung between periods of consensus and uncertainty
Consensus Uncertainty
1873–1914 
 
Gold standard,
real bills doctrine,
lender of last resort (LLR)
1914–1933 
 
Breakdown of gold standard,
breakdown of real bills doctrine,
unemployment and inflation
1934–1970 
 
 
Fiscal (Keynesian) dominance,
central bank subject to finance ministry,
financial repression,
interest rates used for balance of payments, otherwise low
1971–1990 
 
Stagflation,
monetarism vs. Keynesianism,
liberalisation and financial crises
1990–2007 
 
Independent central banks,
inflation targets,
Great Moderation
2008 to 
present 
Great Financial Crisis (GFC),
financial instability,
deflation
Source: Author’s compilation.
As shown in table 1, it is obvious 
that we are in the middle of a period of 
major uncertainty about the appropri-
ate role and functions of central banks. 
Some conclusions have, however, been 
fairly clearly drawn from the Great 
 Financial Crisis (GFC), including the 
assertion that the previous ideas were 
erroneous, as follows:
Table 2
Generally accepted myths pre-2007
(i) Price stability, plus Basel capital adequacy ratios, would guarantee solvency.
(ii) With solvency thus guaranteed, liquidity will always be available via wholesale markets.
(iii) That maturity mismatch in the banking system can be ignored.
Source: Author’s compilation.
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But there are many uncertainties left:
1  The structure of the banking 
system
There is a historical regularity here. 
After each crisis, and in each period of 
uncertainty, there is a search for rules 
that might have prevented the prior cri-
sis. In each case there is a move towards 
the more radical proposals, but the 
 actual outcome is a compromise.
Table 3
Crises and Reactions
Date Crisis Radical proposal Compromise outcome
Early 1800s Suspension of gold standard Ricardo’s currency board Bank Charter Act 1844
1929–1933 Collapse of U.S. banking system Chicago Plan Glass-Steagall Act
1970s Stagflation Monetarism Pragmatic monetarism
Now Collapse of banking systems Narrow banking Ring-fencing and …?
Source: Author’s compilation.
2  The ability of macroprudential instruments to maintain  financial 
stability
The following queries remain:
Table 4
Some queries about the use of macroprudential instruments
(i) Are they intended to protect the economy from banks, or banks from the economy? What is their main purpose?
(ii) Will they be used aggressively enough (Brainard caution)?
(iii) What is the dividing line between macroprudential and other policies, e.g. fiscal?
(iv) Since the dividing lines are fuzzier, who is responsible for controls?
(v) How does one distinguish between sustainable and unsustainable financial developments, and how can one 
communicate that distinction to both politicians and public, both of whom enjoy being in a boom period?
Source: Author’s compilation.
3 Do we need to rethink monetary policy?
Table 5
Some queries about current monetary policies
Question Answer
A higher target? No.
Lean vs. clean? Try macroprudential instruments first.
Why so ineffective? Weakness of banking sector.
How to communicate? Base forward guidance on states, not dates. 
But even states are unpredictable.
What if another downturn happens? Helicopter money? Negative interest rates?
Source: Author’s compilation.
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4 The technology of banking
Perhaps the main uncertainty is the 
rapidly changing technology of banking 
(and central banks). Banking is based 
on transactions and information tech-
nologies. Both of these are rapidly 
changing. Underlying queries relate to:
5 Where are central banks now?
Let us contrast the state of central 
banks in the Great Moderation (GM) 
 
 
 
 
 
with that now following the Great 
 Financial Crisis (GFC).
Table 6
Some queries about technology
(i) Efficiency and state security vs. privacy and 
liberalism.
(ii) Blockchain ledger transactions.
(iii) Speed vs. equality of opportunity. High-frequency 
trading and frequent auctions.
Source: Author’s compilation.
Table 7
Contrast in the role of central banks
Focus Instruments Confidence Independence
GM Narrow: Single:
Price stability Interest rates High Undoubted
GFC Broader: Many: Groping At some risk
Price stability Interest rates
Financial stability Unconventional monetary policy (UMP)
Macroprudential policy
Stress tests
Resolution
Source: Author’s compilation.
6 So whither central banking?
Central banks have now been awarded, 
and/or have assumed, far more power 
than previously, but have much less 
confidence about how to use such 
 powers. An unstable condition?
The future cannot – perhaps fortu-
nately – be forecast.
